DE RUEHRL #0831 1901715 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 091715Z JUL 09 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4570 INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0178 RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0143 RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0702 RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 0012 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1035 RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1375 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0218 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0751 RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 0507 RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY 0005 RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY 0108 RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0210 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0013 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0687 RUEHMV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA PRIORITY 0040 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2065 RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 0007 RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0148 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0577 RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0432 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1171 RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 0136 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0562 RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0265 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 2107 RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY 0114 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0582 RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 0213 RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0440 RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 1200 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1620 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0790

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 000831

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2019
TAGS: EWWT MARR PGOV PHSA PHUM PREL MOPS GM
SUBJECT: CGPCS: GERMANY AGREES ON PARTICIPATION ISSUE, BUT
IS STILL OFFSIDE REGARDING INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL

REF: A. STATE 66632 <u>1</u>B. BERLIN 580

Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR STAN OTTO. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).

11. (C) Post delivered ref A points to MFA UN Security Council Action Officer Dirk Stockhausen on June 30 and then followed up with him on July 2, emphasizing the importance that the U.S. placed on reaching a resolution that would allow the six aspirant countries to participate in the Contact Group for Piracy off the coast of Somalia (CGPCS). Stockhausen said that Germany agreed completely on the U.S. criteria for participation in the CGPCS and thought all six aspirant countries should be included. He thought it was especially important that Cyprus, notwithstanding Turkish objections, be part of the group, given its status as one of the largest flag states in the world. He also agreed that the best way forward at this point was simply to have the respective chairs of the plenary and working group meetings to issue invitations as they saw fit, including to the six aspirants.

STILL SUPPORTIVE OF AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL

12. (C) Stockhausen also noted that Germany continued to support establishing an international piracy tribunal, notwithstanding the arguments against the idea put forth by the U.S. in its recent non-paper. He said that Germany, for

example, planned to participate in a July 7 meeting that the Netherlands was hosting on this issue. He said the problem with prosecuting piracy cases in national courts on the basis of the "victim state principle" was that it was not always very clear which affected state should take the lead. Should it be the flag state of the ship? Or should the decision be based on the nationality of the ship-owner, the owner of the cargo and/or the ship's crew? He also noted that in Germany, the final decision on whether to pursue prosecution of a suspected pirate lay in the hands of judicial authorities, not the government, which meant that national prosecution was not always a reliable mechanism.

13. (C) Stockhausen said the German view was that it made much more sense to prosecute these piracy cases locally, in the region where they were committed, rather than sending the suspected pirates all over the world for prosecution in different national jurisdictions. Since it was not possible (nor in some cases desirable) for Kenya and other countries in the region to prosecute all these cases in their national courts, it was necessary to have an international tribunal. He reiterated the arguments that Germany has made before (ref B) about setting up the tribunal by either attaching it to an already existing national court in the region, as was done in Cambodia (the so-called "Khmer Rouge Tribunal") or establishing it as a stand-alone structure in a region where there is already administrative and clerical expertise, such as in Arusha, Tanzania, where the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda is located. Koenig